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Good Fences Make 
Good Neighbors 
Sandra Joireman 
 
It is in the best interest of the United States to urge a rapid demarcation 
of the Ethiopian–Eritrean border. Full Recommendations, page 4. 
 
Summary:  
A ceasefire in the border war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea is only the be-
ginning of the process of conflict 
resolution that must occur for peace 
to take hold. The border war is the 
result of long standing distrust and 
animosity between these two coun-
tries.  Therefore the possibility of 
the conflict erupting into violence 
again is high unless serious internal 
and international effort is put into the 
demarcation of the border and the 
acceptance of that demarcated border 
as fair. 
The United States needs to 
work towards strengthening its 
relationship with Ethiopia in 
particular, as this has been damaged 
by its reactions to the border war. 
Ethiopia is our most important, and 
possibly our only ally in the Horn of 
Africa. Its efforts at democratization, 
its size and its relative stability make 
it essential to the promotion of US 
interests in the entire Horn region. It 
is therefore necessary for the United 
States to build strong relations with 
Ethiopia as well as encourage peace 
and economic development.  
  
IGCC is a multicampus research unit of the University of California, established in 1983 to conduct 
original research and inform public policy debate on the means of attenuating conflict and estab-
lishing cooperation in international relations. Policy Briefs provide recommendations based on the 
work of UC faculty and participants in institute programs. Authors’ views are their own. 
Efforts to resolve the border conflict 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been 
characterized by a complete lack of trust 
on the part of both countries. Hence the 
decision of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
to “fight while we negotiate and negoti-
ate while we fight.” Once a ceasefire 
between the parties is negotiated, the 
conflict will not be fully resolved; there-
fore it is essential for the United States 
and other countries to facilitate a rapid 
demarcation of the border that is satisfac-
tory to both parties. Without a mutually 
satisfactory border the likelihood for 
further violent conflict is high as the 
border area has now become imbued with 
deep political meaning as a physical 
manifestation of nationalism and the 
respect for sovereignty.  
Origins of the Conflict 
Serious economic problems between the 
two countries began in 1997. Ethiopia 
was, at that point, already angry with 
Eritrea about excessively high port 
charges that Ethiopia had to pay in order 
to export its coffee crop through Assab. 
The two countries shared a common cur-
rency, the Ethiopian birr, and Ethiopia 
was upset that Eritrea was using birr to 
acquire dollars and thereby tightening the 
money supply in both countries. In 1997, 
Eritrea came out with its own currency. 
Ethiopia insisted that interstate transac-
tions be conducted in dollars, which put 
economic pressure on Eritrea as it then 
had to pay for imports of food and other 
Ethiopian resources in dollars. By the 
end of 1997 what had been a cordial rela-
tionship between the two countries had 
broken down. 
The physical confrontation began when 
armed Eritrean troops crossed the de 
facto border at Badme. According to the 
Ethiopian government, Eritrean troops 
entered Ethiopia in violation of an exist-
ing agreement that prohibited the cross-
ing of the border by armed military per-
sonnel. Ethiopian police reminded the 
Eritrean soldiers of this agreement and 
asked them to leave their weapons if they 
wished to enter Ethiopia. The Eritrean 
troops refused to comply and opened fire 
on the Ethiopian police, killing two.  
The Eritreans claim that Badme is their 
own territory based on maps from the 
Italian colonial era. The Eritrean gov-
ernment alleges that after 1991 the Ethio-
pian government had a systematic policy 
of attempting to expand their northern 
province of Tigray through the acquisi-
tion of Eritrean territory. They claim that 
in 1992 Tigray administration officials 
crossed the true border and put new bor-
der markers deep in Eritrean territory. 
Subsequently Ethiopians from the Tigray 
region moved into this newly reclaimed 
area and Eritreans living there began to 
be harassed. Attempts to peacefully re-
solve the conflict were allegedly met 
with further territorial aggression and 
harassment by the Ethiopians until the 
Eritrean troops were called into protect 
the interests of the local people. 
Ethiopia has acknowledged that there are 
problems with the demarcation of the 
border between the two countries. How-
ever, Eritrean movement into the Badme 
area was seen as a violation of Ethiopian 
sovereignty due to the fact that Badme 
had never been administered by an Eri-
trean government, not since 1991 and not 
during the Italian colonial period. A bi-
lateral border commission had been es-
tablished to resolve the border conflicts, 
but the Eritrean military takeover of 
Badme moved the dispute out of the 
realm of diplomacy and into the realm of 
armed conflict. 
The conflict erupted into violence spo-
radically from May 1998 until May 2000. 
On May 12, 2000 a week after yet an-
other attempt to resolve the conflict 
through negotiation failed and two days 
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before the Ethiopian parliamentary elec-
tions, Ethiopia went on the offensive and 
within two weeks had driven deep into 
Eritrean territory. It was able to reclaim 
all the disputed territory around Badme 
and take land in the West and South of 
Eritrea. Now Ethiopia holds the upper 
hand in negotiations and says it will not 
withdraw from the area it occupies until a 
peacekeeping force takes those areas 
over. At the same time, Ethiopia has been 
engaged in proximity talks mediated by 
the Organization of African Unity and 
has also been moving offensively on the 
Assab front. 
Effects of the Conflict  
Apart from the 120,000 casualties (est.) 
incurred by both sides, there are esti-
mates that nearly a quarter of Eritrea’s 
population had to flee their homes to get 
away from the fighting. Thus the human 
toll to both sides, and particularly the 
Eritreans, has been profound. The coun-
tries have also spent large sums of money 
on arms and provisions for troops at the 
front. These are funds that are taken 
away from development, education and 
drought relief. Figures range between 
300-400 million dollars spent on arms by 
both countries last year. A UN arms em-
bargo was placed on both countries in 
May, but it was too little too late. It will 
have little effect on the conflict, and has 
done much to damage relations between 
the US and the UK and Ethiopia. To the 
human costs and opportunity costs of the 
war we must also add ecological damage. 
Fighting has occurred in what is a very 
fragile and arid ecosystem. Not only are 
farmers not able to plant crops in the 
contested areas, which will certainly 
worsen the affects of the three year 
drought the Horn is undergoing at the 
present time, but fighting has polluted the 
whole border region with the detritus of 
war, from landmines and shell casings to 
rotting corpses.  
Policy Failures 
So far the United States has had two 
strategies to deal with the conflict. One, 
followed from the earliest days of the 
conflict originated in the State Depart-
ment under the auspices of Susan Rice. It 
seemed to follow the Hippocratic adage 
“first, do no harm.” The US State De-
partment has encouraged both countries 
to peacefully solve their problems 
through the OAU peace process, and 
employed special envoy Tony Lake to 
push the countries towards that goal. 
When the May 2000 offensive began, 
this apparently was no longer sufficient. 
Perhaps it was the juxtaposition of media 
images of starving children in the 
Ogaden and tanks moving across the 
border. Whatever the impetus, a UN dip-
lomatic mission headed by US Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations Richard Hol-
brooke diverted its itinerary from the 
Congo to the Horn of Africa because of 
indications (shipments of blood plasma to 
the front lines) that active fighting was 
about to begin again. 
After meeting with the leaders of Ethio-
pia and Eritrea, Holbrooke left the area 
declaring the conflict to be “senseless” 
and solvable “through diplomatic 
means.” The US then pushed forward a 
plan to establish an arms embargo for 
both countries through the United Na-
tions Security Council. Resolution 1298 
was passed on May 17, 2000. It provided 
for a complete embargo to both countries 
for a year. 
While Eritrea was relatively quiet about 
the resolution, Ethiopians were incensed. 
The streets of Addis Ababa were filled 
with demonstrators stoning the US and 
UK embassies and burning Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair in effigy. From the 
Ethiopian perspective, the arms embargo 
punished them for defending their sover-
eignty. Ethiopian relations with the US 
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have since deteriorated and the war con-
tinues apace.  
Having Impact 
If the United States is to have a serious 
impact in the Horn of Africa, where we 
have both economic and humanitarian 
interests, it is essential that we form a 
more constructive relationship with 
Ethiopia. Prior to the outbreak of the 
border war Ethiopia was a major player 
in peace efforts in Sudan and economic 
development in the region through the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Devel-
opment (IGAD). Ethiopia is also the only 
country in the Horn that is engaged in 
democratization. With a major conflict 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the con-
structive role IGAD played in the region 
is virtually gone and there is no country 
in the Horn with which the United States 
can do business, either economically or 
diplomatically. Moreover, at the present 
moment, our efforts to play both sides in 
the border conflict has led to a frosty 
relationship with Ethiopia which will 
ultimately be damaging to US interests. 
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How to stabilize the Horn of Africa: 
1. Use all possible means to force Ethiopia and Eritrea to agree on a demarca-
tion of the border satisfactory to both parties. Until this happens any peace that ex-
ists will be fragile. 
2. Increase US investment and trade initiatives in Ethiopia. Particularly now 
with the passing of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act there are opportunities 
to increase a positive US role in the country. 
3. Once the conflict ends, resurrect the political role of IGAD through a focus 
on refugee issues. This is a role IGAD has had in the past; it will be both necessary 
and uncontroversial once conflict ends.  
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